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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
from the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to Article 8 Section 9, 
Constitution of Utah, Section 78-2-2 (i), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The case of Pate -vs- Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (1984) 
defines the circumstances when a judgment which is not final may be 
appealed, as provided in Rule 54(b). On page 767 the Utah Supreme 
Court states: 
"First, there must be multiple claims of relief or multiples 
parties to the action. Second, the judgment appeal from must have 
been entered on an order that would be appealable but for the fact 
that other claims or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial 
court in, its discretion must make a determination that there is no 
just reason for delay of the appeal." 
In the above action there are multiple parties and multiple 
claims. The cause of action has arisen out of claims made prior to 
October 1, 1986 and claims made subsequent to October 1, 1986. The 
Partial Summary Judgnent appealed would be appealable but for the 
fact that other claims occurred after October 1, 1986 and remain in 
the action. Finally on December 14f 1987 the Honorable Scott Daniels 
signed an order stating that there is no just reason for delay of the 
appeal of the Partial Summary Judgnent because the vast majority of 
damages occurred before October 1, 1986. Therefore the Supreme Court 
of Utah obtained jurisdiction under the direction of Rule 54(b). 
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Following an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court 
issued an order on January 15f 1988 directing the Court of Appeals to 
rule on the case. 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINS 
This appeal is from a Partial Summary Judgiient in the Third 
Judicial District Court wherein Judge Daniels ordered that the 
Defendants-Respondents are granted "partial summary judgiient, no 
cause of action, with respect to any and all claims of the Plaintiffs 
against the Defendants which arose prior to October 1, 1986, such 
claims "being barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of 
entry of the Small Claims Judgment identified above". Plaintiffs-
Appellants appeal from the Partial Summary Judgiient under the theory 
that the Small Claims Court had no jurisdiction or authority to rule 
on any matters except the issue of lease payments that was pleaded by 
the Plaintiffs-Appellants in Snail Claims Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the District Court errored by granting a Partial 
Sundry Judgiient to Defendant-Respondents with respect to any and all 
claims of the Plaintiffs-Appellants against Defendants-Respondents 
which arose prior to October 1, 1986. The judgnent was based on the 
doctrine of res judicata which Defendants-Respondents alledged 
occurred when the Small Claims Court entered a Judgment which 
included the following language: 
"No Sept. obligation owed because of the Plaintiffs failure to 
take steps to reasonably mitigate damages. No further rent owing." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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This is an appeal taken from the Partial Summary Judgnent of 
the District Court that found that the Defendants-Respondents were 
entitled a judgnent against Plaintiffs-Appellants and that all claims 
of the Plaintiffs-Appellants prior to October 1, 1986, were barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata as a result of an entry of judgnent 
filed in the Small Claims Court. Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that 
the Small Claims Court exceeded its jurisdiction in making its ruling 
and therefore the doctrines of res judicata applies only to the lease 
payments for the months of July, August and part of September. 
On February 11, 1980, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Defendants-
Respondents entered into a lease whereby Defendants-Respondents 
leased from the Plaintiffs-Appellants property located at 11255 East 
Miller Avenue in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
On September 10, 1986, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Small 
Claims Affidavit and Order (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A 
in the Addendum) in which the Plaintiffs-Appellants claimed that the 
Defendants-Respondents were indebted to the Plaintiffs-Appellants in 
the sum of $1,000 for unpaid lease payments for July (in the amount 
of $492.10), August (in the amount of $492.10) and $15-80 towards the 
September payment. Defendants-Respondents did not file a 
Counterclaim. 
On October 21, 1986, a hearing on the above matter was held and 
a Small Claims Judgnent (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B in 
the Addendum) against the Defendants-Respondents in favor of the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants was granted in the amount of $984.25 principal 
plus court costs of $30 for a total judgnent of $1,014*25. However, 
in addition to granting the judgment the judge also wrote "No Sept. 
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obligation owed because of Plaintiffs failure to take steps to 
reasonably mitigate damages. Ko further rent owing." 
On December 18, 1986, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a ccnplaint 
in the Third Judicial District Court (a copy of which is attacned 
hereto as Exhibit C in the Addendum). In the complaint the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants asked for the following: 
1. For an amount of $984*25 for loss of lease payments (this 
was in addition to the aiaoiint granted the Plaintiffs-Appellants in 
the Small Claims Court). 
2. Judgment against the Defendants in the amount of $834.60 
for taxes, $295*84 for sewer fee, and $165 for insurance, which the 
lease required the Defendants-Respondents to pay. 
3. An amount of $22,923*89 plus costs to restore buildings 
plus an additional $5i000 for landscaping so that the property could 
be restored in substantially the same condition it was prior to the 
Defendants-Respondents entering into the lease. 
4- $25,000 as compensation for mental and physical damages. 
5. Attorneys fees and court costs. 
Defendants-Respondents filed an Answer and Cross-Claim. 
Defendants-Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was 
heard on October 25, 1987* The Motion alleged that the Small Claims 
Judgment resolved all issues concerning the lease prior to October 1, 
1986. Judge Scott Daniels granted the Defendants-Respondents Partial 
Summary Judgnent with respect to ending all claims of the Plaintiffs-
Appellants which arose prior to October 1, 1986 (a copy of the 
Partial Summary Judgment is included as Exhibit D in the Addendum). 
Plaintiffs-Appellants appealed. 
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SUMiARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
A Snail Claims Court is a court created by statute. As a 
statutory court it only has power specifically granted to it by the 
act creating it. The jurisdiction of Small Claims Court is limited 
to the claims of money only in the amount of up to 31,000. The 
Affidavit filed by the Plaintiffs-Appellants was filed correctly and 
the Small Claims Court had jurisdiction over whether rents were due 
for the months of July, August and part of September. However, the 
part of the order of the court stating that no September obligation 
was owed because of the failure to take steps to reasonably mitigate 
damages and that no further rent was owing under the lease was a 
decision that was beyond the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court 
and therefore could not involk the doctrine of res judicata at the 
District Court level. Also the Small Claims Court has no 
jurisdiction to hear the above matters because the Defendants-
Respondents did not file a Counterclaim in Small Claims Court. 
The District Court errored in ruling that the doctrine of res 
judicata applied to all damages which occured before October 1, 1986. 
Therefore the Partial Summary Judgpient should be set aside and the 
court should be instructed to try the issues outlined in the 
complaint and Counterclaim* 
DETAIL OP THE ARGUMENT 
Small Claim Courts were statutorily created under Section 78-6-
1 throu^i 15 of Utah Code Annotated (1953)• Section 78-6-1 states: 
!!(1) There is created in the circuit courts and justice's 
courts of this state, a department known as the "SMALL CLAIMS COURT," 
which has jurisdiction, but not exclusive, in cases: 
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a. for the recovery of money where the amount claimed 
does not exceed $1
 f000 and where the defendant resides or the action 
of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in 
which the action is to be maintained; or 
b. involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not exceed 
the jurisdiction of the court." 
"The Small Claims Court Act (the Act) was established in the 
legislature to make it possible to dispose of certain actions in an 
informal manner from their inception to their end with the sole 
object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties. The small 
claims court is totally a creature of statute. Its jurisdiction is 
not exclusive and is limited to the recovery of money up to $1,000." 
Faux -vs- Kickelsen at 725 Pacific 2nd 1372, p. 1374- (1986). 
In the present case the Plaintiffs-Appellants properly filed 
their claim for relief in the Snail Claims Court because their claim 
was for money damages and the amount sought was not in excess of 
$1,000. Therefore the Small Claims Court obtained juristiction in 
the case. The Defendants-Respondents did not file a counterclaim. 
The Small Claims Court then ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs-
Appellants in the amount of $984 plus costs. 
Had the Small Claims Court stopped at this point then no error 
would have been created. However, the court then added the following 
language to the Srria.11 Claim Judgment. "No Sept. obligation owed 
because of the Plaintiffs failure to take steps to reasonably 
mitigate damages. Eo further rent owing." 
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No transcripts are taken of ana.ll Claims Court proceedings so 
there is no way to determine how the Small Claims Court reached such 
the decision cited above. It is the contention of Plaintiffs-
Appellants that the Small Claims Court never had jurisdiction over 
the issues of mitigation of damages and what additional rents were 
incurred. In Mann -vs- Morrison cited at 144 P«2d 543 (1943)» "the 
Utah Supreme Court quotes from page 545 > Justice Wolfe fs language in 
the Atwood -vs- Cox case. "Many definitions of jurisdiction are 
given in 15 C.J. 723 SS 13. They all mean, fundamentally, the power 
or capacity given by the law to a court, tribunal, board, body, or 
officer to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. * * 
* It does not mean that the court must speak correctly by the law. 
What it says may be incorrect. * * *It takes a pleading to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court, but, if the pleading shows that the cause 
or controversy relates to a subject-matter over which the court has 
jurisdiction, then the jurisdiction of the court is effective for the 
purpose of proceeding with the cause or controversy.11 In the same 
opinion at page 452 of the Utah report, at page 3&4 of 55 P*2d, it is 
said: "It would appear that excess of jurisdiction means a case in 
which the court has initially proceeded properly within its 
jurisdiction but steps out of the jurisdiction in the making of some 
order or in the doing of some judicial act." 
Jurisdiction is then the power or capacity given by the law to 
the court to entertain, hear and determine certain controversy's. 
Because the Small Claims Court is totally a creature of statute, its 
jurisdiction is not exclusive but is limited to claims for money 
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only. Kapetanov -vs- Small Claims Court of Ogden, 659 P2d 1049 
(1983). 
V<hen the Small Claims Court began considering issues such as 
the responsibility of Plaintiff to mitigate damages under the terms 
of the lease and further determined that no rent was owing under the 
lease for any claims prior to October 1, 1986 then it clearly 
exceeded its jurisdiction because it was deciding issues concerning 
Real Estate and deciding issues for monetary amounts in excess of 
$1,000. Therefore the Snail Claims Court had no jurisdiction over 
these matters. 
The reason the Plaintiffs-Appellants limited their claim before 
the Snail Claims Court to the failure to make lease payments for July 
and August and a portion of September was that that amount owed 
equalled $1,000. This was the highest amount of money damages that 
the court could consider. Additional lease payments were owed but 
Plaintiffs-Appellants could not proceed with those claims in Small 
Claims Court without violating the jurisdiction of the court. If the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants didn't have jurisdiction to plead for 
additional damages, certainly the Small Claims Court could not involk 
jurisdiction over monetary amounts in excess of $1,000. 
The second reason that the Small Claims Court exceeded its 
jurisdiction was that the Defendants-Respondents did not file a 
Counterclaim before the Small Claims Court. Section 78-6-10 Utah 
Code Ann.(1953) outlines the Plaintiffs right of appeal in Small 
Claims Court. "The judgment of said court shall be conclusive upon 
the Plaintiff unless a counterclaim has been interposed". The case 
of Lieatke v. Schettler 649 P.2d 80 reviewed the constitutionally of 
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Section 78-6-10. The court ruled that the limitation of Plaintiff's 
right to appeal is not in violation of the guarantee in Article I, 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and therefore is enforcable. 
Defendants-Respondents failure to file a Counterclaim prevents them 
by statute from having any issue heard except the issue presented by 
the Plaintiff. In Paux -vs- Mikelson 725 P2d. 1372 (1966) the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that a Counterclaim need not be filed by the 
Defendants in Small Claims Court, but could be filed in Circuit or 
District Court. They therefore concluded that the failure to file a 
Counterclaim at the Small Claims Court level and then filing a 
Counterclaim in a higher court was not prevented by the doctrine of 
res judicata. Ey not filing a Counterclaim in Small Claims Court, 
the Defendants-Respondents elected to have these issues heard by a 
higher court. 
Defendants-Respondents failure to file a Counterclaim in Small 
Claims Court prevented the court from considering any issues except 
the money damages pleaded by the Plaintiffs-Appellants. Any claims 
made by the Defendants-Respondents would have to be tried in District 
Court when the Defendant-Respondents raised the issues by 
Counterclaim. 
In Peterson -vs- Peterson cited at 645 P*2d 37 (1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court states on Pages 38 and 39 that "Res judicata applies to 
bar the relitigation of issues which were actually litigated or could 
have been litigated in the prior proceeding." After examining the 
conduct of the Small Claims Court, it is clear that the issues 
concerning the terms and conditions of the lease and other rents were 
not properly litigated and could not have been litigated in the Small 
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Claims Court without the court exceeding its jurisdiction. Therefore 
the District Court errored in ruling that the doctrine of res 
judicata prevented the Plaintiffs-Appellants from litigating issues 
which arose prior to October 1, 1986. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiffs-Appellants pray that the Partial Summary Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court be reversed and the District Court 
be ordered to hold a trial in which the Plaintiffs-Appellants and the 
Defendants-Respondents may litigate all the issues concerning the 
lease, including rents, and damages thereof except for the July, 
August and part of September rents that was properly litigated in the 
Snail Claims Court. 
DATED this 25th day of April, y&&. 
9<4%v- J 
^s&tev'en L. 'Godwin 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AKD STATUTES 
78-2-1.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
Membership on state law library board, Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art. 
« 37 1 1 VIII. Stir. 7 
TrocoodingH unuifcclud by • vucuucy, Kolirumont, Uluh Cutwl., Art. VUI, Hoc. 15, 
$ 78-7-21 $ 49-7a-l et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30. 
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur . 2d Courts Key Numbers. — Courts *» 101, 248; 
&§ 67, 68. Judges *» 1, 7 to 12. 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 465; 48A C.J.S. 
Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
78-2-1.5. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, 
225, > 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court § 4. 
78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 
134, § 1; 1981, ch. 156, § 1), relating to sala-
ries of justices, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 
267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1988], 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
(if orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original uppellute jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 
1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
U C U 1 U U 
78-6-12 5 Abstract of judgment for defendant 78-6-14 Fees 
— Form 78-6-15 Costs 
78-6-13 Filing of abstract and docketing of 
judgment 
78-6-1. Creation — Jurisdiction — Counsel not necessary 
— Deferring multiple claims of one plaintiff. 
(1) There is created in the circuit courts and justice's courts of this state, a 
department known as the "SMALL CLAIMS COURT," which has jurisdiction, 
but not exclusive, in cases: 
(a) for the recovery of money where the amount claimed does not ex-
ceed $1,000 and where the defendant resides or the action of indebtedness 
was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to 
be maintained; or 
(b) involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not exceed the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
(2) Persons or corporations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in 
person or through authorized employees with or without counsel. 
(3) If person or corporation files multiple claims in any one small claims 
court, the clerk or judge of the court may remove all but the initial claim from 
the court's calendar in order to dispose of all other small claims court matters. 
Claims so removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the court's calendar. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-6-1; L. 1953, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 
180, § 1; 1969, ch. 256, § 1; 1970, ch. 26, § 1; 
1977, ch. 77, § 61; 1977, ch. 78, § 28; 1983, 
ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 48, § 1; 1986, ch. 187, 
§ 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment increased the amount from $400 to $600 
in the first sentence, and added Subsection (2) 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch 48 
designated the former first sentence in the for-
merly undesignated first paragraph as Subsec-
tions (1) and (l)(a), designated the former sec-
ond sentence in the formerly undesignated 
first paragraph as subsection (2), redesignated 
ANALYSIS 
Action by corporation 
—Necessity for attorney. 
Jurisdiction 
—Concurrent 
—Fraud or misrepresentation 
Action by corporation. 
—Necessity for attorney. 
Even though a corporation was a "person" 
former Subsection (2) as present Subsection 
(3), made a series of minor stylistic changes 
throughout Subsection (1), deleted "onh" fol-
lowing "money" in Subsection (l)(a), and in-
serted Subsection (1Kb) 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch 187 
in Subsection (1) substituted "$1,000" for 
"$600' and made minor word changes through-
out 
This section is set out as reconciled b\ the 
Office of Legislative 'Research and General 
Counsel 
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, 
§ 78-4-1 et seq 
Justices' courts, § 78-5-1 et seq 
v>hich could maintain an action in a small 
claims court, a corporation could not practice 
lav* and an officer or employee of a corporation 
could not properly institute an action in the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
170 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 31. 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 291. 
Key Numbers. — Courts «=» 176, 181. 
78-6-9. Judgment against defendant — Payment. 
If the judgment or order be against the defendant, he shall pay the same 
forthwith or at such times and upon such terms and conditions as the justice 
or court shall prescribe. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-6-9. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 31. 
C.J.S. — 21 CJ.S Courts § 291. 
Key Numbers. — Courts «=> 176, 181. 
78-6-10. Conclusiveness of judgment — Jurisdiction for 
appeals. 
(1) The judgment of the small claims department of the justices' and circuit 
court is conclusive upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim has been inter-
posed. 
(2) If the matter is heard in the small claims department of the circuit 
court, the defendant may appeal the judgment of the circuit court to the Court 
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal within five days of the entry of the 
judgment against him. 
(3) If the matter is heard in the small claims department of the justices' 
court, the defendant may obtain a trial de novo in the circuit court by filing in 
the circuit court of the county a petition for trial de novo within five days of 
the entry of the judgment against him. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Appeal from circuit 
Supp., 104-6-10; 1986, ch. 47, § 76. court to Court of Appeals, § 78-4-11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Trial de novo, § 78-4-7.5. 
ment rewrote this section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
—Limitation upon plaintiffs right to appeal. 
—Time for filing notice of appeal 
Time for appeal. 
—Commencement. 
179 
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he s ? of has been paid; and , <S.&^|> V" :;/ ^m^i^^^^&Pk j fSp^^L, 
^o\ mi,«+ defendant and plaintiff reside at the addresses shown iXthe^bove ^ p t i r o ^ :^2X~~ ? *^ " 3r »^ 
V : ' /• .' -^-* , r •;.'.' •
 £ -AffiantjfPlaintimjfef^W-f;MlK> 
Subscribed and sworn to before tne on the date of 
. ^ a l f """'^WELDONfflCHOLS a?"V "<%$ 
•* ^* - %0TICE 
HISAFFIDAVITSHALLNOTBEBERVED-MORE 
HAN 20 DAYS NOR LESS THAN 5 DAYS FROM 
HE DATE OF THIS ORDER. V ^ V h &••&:
 t"*,?J% 
 ?'1«5 ^IZlI^ebuta^ier innSTrT # « a f e ^ 
fc'4*«' 
• ^ f e l ^ ^ 
***]:-
. . . . ~ .
 n
^ p f " X ' 4bRDER'^L _ . .
 L. , . ^ 
'HE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFlSNDANT<S)7 
YOU ARE ORDERED to appear and answer the above^ai: 
ti 
)ate of trial. ¥&$ « 4 
lace of trial: 440 JEast *680 South, Sandy, Utah 84070. I J^me^irial:L 
nd to have with you, tv ^ *' "•'* * J " " ^ " ' ' 
stablish your defense \ 
•You are further notified that If you do not i 
>r the amount of plaintiffs claim as stated f 
•J 
/ B y 
Clerk 
mClaims-2 UCA 78^6-2.^ 3 
Circuit Court, State of Uta^ 
SALT 1AKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
>Qky lf AID HAXt F. AERIKCTON 
. PMntitt 
LOLERT V. MITCHELL Defendant 
SMALL CLAIMS 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 860031055 SC 
This matter came before the court for hearing on the affidavit of plaintiff, and the defendant has been 
)6 with the affidavit of plaintiff and order to defend, and return of service has been made. The 
ring parties appeared at the hearing: 
iainttff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set. and the defendant's default has been 
ntered. 
k>th plaintiff and defendant appeared and presented evidence. \  lai tiff a a efe a t a { 
3„ OO 
SL 
±Ja 
Principal 
0 
. Court costs, and 
10 I q*25rr>TAt JUDGMENT 
OCfOBDR 1 
"fro & y ^ 6MtQaiu>r 
=*=UJ-
JUDGE 
oth Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at Hearing. 
HE DEFENDANT ONLY: 
Clerk 
1
 tne above judgment WBS granted in favor of the plaintiff, you now have a judgment against you in 
ircuit Court in tne amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied with this judgment, you have only 
(5) DAYS from receipt pf this notice to appeal the case to the District Court. 
HE PLAINTIFF ONLY: 
ou should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five 
rom receipt of the notice to appeal the case. You must complete the mailing certificate and file the 
at of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further court action. 
hereby certify that I mailed a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above 
5 taftnauitft; «,t „ 
Addratt 4 Zip Code 
Dated 
SIGNATURE 
I'"- ^ - 1 _ , . r 
-A-
J^hU<T t> 
Steven L. Godwin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4055 South 700 East, Suite 106 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-8395 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN E. ARRINGTON and MARY F. 
ARRINGTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ROBERT W. MITCHELL and KARQJ G. 
IVERSEN. 
Defendants, 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs John E. Arrington and Mary F. Arrington, 
through their attorney, Steven L. Godwin, and complains against the Defendants 
as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. That the real estate of issue in this complaint, is located 
in the Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
3. On or about February 11, 1980, the Plaintiffs and Defendants 
entered into a lease (herein called lease), wherein the Plaintiffs leased the 
property located at 1255 East Miller Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah to the 
Defendants. The leased property is hereinafter called property* The lease 
between the parties is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit M 
4. That on or about March 5, 1985 the Defendant's exercised the 
first ten year option as outlined in the lease (a copy of the exercise to the 
option is attached nereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein). 
C O M P L A I N T 
civil NO. 6(r^lS^ 
judge Damiels 
5. On or about September 10, 1986 a small claims court 
complaint was filed by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants and on October 1, 
1986, the small claims Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah issued 
a judgnent in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $1,014.25. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 5 herein. 
7. That pursuant to paragraph 16 of the lease, the Plaintiffs 
declared to the Defendants that the lease was terminated as of November 1, 
1986 and on that day, the Plaintiff's re-entered the property and took 
possession thereto. Said termination was based on the following violations of 
the lease: 
a. failure to make lease payments in excess of four (4) months. 
b. laying waste to the property 
c. abandoning the premises 
d. failing to pay for the utilities and services 
e. failing to comply with the laws and ordinance of Salt Lake 
County concerning the maintenance of the property 
f. failing to maintain liability insurance on the property. 
8. That the Defendants owe the Plaintiffs in addition to the 
judgment obtained in small claims court, monthly lease payments for September 
and October of 1986 in a total amount of $984.25. 
9. Paragraph 18 of the lease requires that the Defaulting party 
pay attorneys fees and court costs in order to enforce the lease agreement. 
Plaintiffs have been required to retain an attorney to collect the lease 
payments and to otherwise enforce the lease agreement. It is reasonable and 
proper that the Defendants be required to pay attorneys fees and court costs 
on this natter. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
10. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 9 herein. 
11. The provisions of the lease require the Defendants to pay 
for taxes, utilities and insurance. The taxes that have acrued on the 
property but have not been paid by the Defendants during the period in whicn 
the lease was in full force and effect are $834.60. Said taxes plus penalty 
and interest should be paid by the Defendants. The utility bills that have 
not been paid by the Defendants during the period in which the lease was in 
full force and effect is $295.84. That amount plus interest is due and owing 
by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs. Fire Insurance in the amount of $165.0C 
insuring the back house for the period of April 1986 to April 1087 was paid by 
the Plaintiffs. That amount plus interest is due and owing to the Plaintiffs. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraph 1 through 11 herein. 
13. The provision of the lease require the Defendants to 
maintain the improvements on the property in good condition. However, the 
defendants have wasted the property and allow the property to deteriorate and 
be destroyed 
14. The Plantiffs have contacted Wally Bolden who has informed 
them that it will cost $22,893.89 plus $30.00 for a bid to restore the 
property in the condition it was prior to the lease. Therefore, the amount of 
$22,923.89 should be paid to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant to restore the 
property in the condition it was prior to the lease. It is estimated that an 
additional cost of $5,000.00 will be required to restore the landscaping which 
was destroyed during the life of the lease. Said amount should be paid by the 
Defendants. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
15. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 14 herein. 
16. That it will take several months to repair the homes and 
relandscape the property into the conditions that they were prior to the 
lease* It is reasonable and fair that the Defendants pay to the Plaintiffs a 
monthly lease fee of $492.10 plus taxes and other costs until the property is 
repaired to state of condition that it was prior to the lease. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 16 herein. 
18. That the Plaintiffs are a retired couple who depend upon the 
income of the lease to maintain themselves in a reasonable manner. 
19. Because of their limited income, the Plaintiffs depended 
upon the lease income to maintain themselves in a reasonable fashion. The 
Defendants were aware of the importance of the lease payments to maintain the 
Plaintiff's livelyhood and had an obligation of fairdealing and good faith 
performance under the contract. 
20. Because of the wanten and willfull conduct of the Defendant 
and the failure to perform under the lease and the distruction of the 
premises, the Plaintiffs have suffered severe mental and emotional problems. 
Such problems have caused loss of weight, mental anguish and mental and 
physical health. Because of these losses, the Plaintiffs have suffered losses 
in the amount of $25,000 which should be paid to them by the Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray as follows: 
1. For judgment against the Defendants in the amount of $984.25 
for loss of lease payments. 
2. For judgment against the Defendants in the amounts of 
$834.60 for taxes whiich the Defendants failed to pay, $295.84 for sewer fees 
which tne Defendants fai led to pay and $165.00 for insurance which they failed 
t o pay, plus in te res t and cos ts . 
3 . For the amount of $22,923.89 plus cos t s and i n t e r e s t and 
$5,000.00 for landscaping to res tore the property in the condition i t was 
p r io r to the l ease . 
4 . For an amount of $25,000 as compensation for mental and 
physical damage. 
5 . For attorneys fees and court co s t s . 
6 . For such other r e l i e f as the court may deem jus t and proper. 
DATED th is j Y day of December, 1986. 
*ven hi Godwin 
/Attorney for P la in t i f f s 
7070 South 
1850 E. SLC 81il21 
Sept 15, 1980 I v e l l Construction Conpeny 
1*302 So Mains Street Murray, Utah 
82*107 TEL: 262-7751 
Lessors: John E# Arrington and 
Mary F. Arrington Husband and wife. 
Lessees: Robert W« Mitchell a Married Man 
Karen G. Iversen a Married Woman 
RE: Lease 1255 E. Miller Ave Salt Lake CU7, Utah Salt Lake 
County., dated Feb 11, 1980....ATTJENDUX TO SAID LEASE, 
LI owing addi&nal property i s included on the Lease dated Feb 11, 1980: 
Lng at a point 2U6.62 feet South and South 88 degrees 36 f West 518.12 feet from 
it quarter corner of Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Sa l t Lake Base 
vidian; and running thence South 88 degrees 30f West \\6mhS feet to a point on a 
5 foot radius curve to the l e f t (center bears North 76 degrees 27 f 10 t f East); 
Southeasterly along the arc of said curve l5k»21 feetj thence North UJ8.13 feet 
point of BEGDPflNa. 
Dve l ega l ly described property i s located West of the property on the original l ease , 
included in the original Lease with the following terms: 
Above described property i s included in the original Lease for the 
rive years without additional chrage. Ho>*ever, the Lessees agree to pay the Taxes 
above property beginning Jan 1, 198$# 
Also, the Lessees agree to increase the basic rent beginning March 
> to $b75«00 and under no circumstances wi l l the rent be lower than Sii75»OC 
Lng March 1 , 1985# All other conditions of the Lease dated Feb 11, I960 w i l l 
to the above described property., re. e. i« e. Consumer Price Index increases 
;sso: m E. %TT±rt^am J 
Mary F# ArringtorT 
'John  fffo Lessees: n Robert W„ MJbchell >*v 
y^m ft-/ 
Y \ Ujxiii^r-
(2625) DENNIS K. POOLE 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Karen G. Iversen 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 263-3344 
L J . . J w' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN E. ARRINGTON and 
MARY F. ARRINGTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. MITCHELL and 
KAREN G. IVERSEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-9482 
Judge Daniels 
Defendants Iversen*s and Mitchell's Motions For Summary 
Judgment having come on for hearing before the Honorable 
Scott Daniels on the 25th day of August, 1987, and the 
Plaintiffs being represented by their attorney Steven L. 
Godwin and the Defendant Karen G. Iversen being represented 
by her attorney Dennis K. Poole and the Defendant Robert W. 
Mitchell being represented by his attorney Loren E. Weiss 
and the Court having considered the pleadings of the parties 
and certified copies of a Small Claims Affidavit and Order 
and a Small Claims Judgment entered October 1, 1986, in the 
Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake County, Sandy 
Department, Case Number 860031055 SC, and having heard the 
arguments of counsel and finding that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact as to the claims of the Plaintiffs 
which accrued prior to October 1, 1986, and for good cause 
appearing 
ORDERS that the Defendants, and each of them are hereby 
granted partial summary judgment, no cause of action, with 
respect to any and all claims of the Plaintiffs against the 
Defendants which arose prior to October 1, 1986, such claims 
being barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of 
entry of the Small Claims Judgment identified above. 
ORDER DATED this \\ day of^tt^aftT 1987 
BY THE COURT: 
1 THE HONORAECE SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
Depcry C»«* 
- 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the & / day of August, 1987, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of 
Partial Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Steven L. Godwin, Esq. 
4055 South 700 East, Suite 106 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Loren E. Weiss, Esq. 
Midtown Office Plaza, 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
IVSN ORDER 
PLEAD4 
-3-
